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SUMMARY 
Under Contract NASl-15379, ORI, Inc. investigated the risk associated 
with release of graphite fibers following a commercial aircraft accident and 
fire. The computer simulation model developed in Phase I was refined in Phase 
II. Additional experimental data has been made available. Phase II results 
indicate that the risk, considerably lower than that obtained in Phase I, is 
relatively small. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper summarizes ORI's Phase II investigation of the risk associated 
with the potential use of carbon fiber composite material in commercial jet 
aircraft. In Phase I a simulation model was developed to generate risk 
profiles for several airports; the risk profiles show the probability that the 
cost due to accidents in any year exceeds a given amount. The computer model 
simulates aircraft accidents with fire, release of fibers, their downwind 
transport and infiltration of buildings, equipment failures, and resulting 
economic impact. The individual airport results were combined to yield the 
national risk profile. Phase II was conducted to examine the risk with more 
precision, and incorporate previously unavailable experimental data. These 
relationships are illustrated in Figure 1. 
The structure of the OR1 Airport Risk Model is illustrated in Figure 2. 
The principal steps in the simulation of each accident are illustrated in 
Figure 3; each is discussed in turn in this paper. The major focus is on 
those elements of the analysis into which changes were introduced in Phase II, 
principally: 
0 Availability of detailed analyses of jet aircraft accidents with fire 
0 Incorporation of new experimental data for the amount of carbon fiber 
released in a "burn" 
0 Generalization of the OR1 transport and diffusion model 
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0 New evidence indicating high filter efficiency relative to carbon 
fibers 
0 Recent experimental values for equipment failure parameters 
0 Introduction of a more detailed costing model 
0 A new national risk assessment model facilitating the computation of 
statistical confidence limits. 
The report covers these items as well as presenting brief descriptions of all 
other elements of the risk analysis methodology. Phase II results are compared 
to the previous Phase I results. 
ACCIDENT WITH FIRE/RELEASE OF CF 
In Phase I, OR1 conducted a limited analysis of individual aircraft acci- 
dent reports and summary data available through the National Transportation 
Safety Board. In Phase II, under NASA auspices, the major aircraft manufactur- 
ers completed a detailed analysis of approximately 100 jet aircraft accidents 
in which fire played a part. These analyses provided estimates of the damage 
to each major aircraft structural component. It was determined that the annual 
fire-accident rate pertinent to the risk assessment was 3.8; this has been 
accepted as the best estimate available for the 1993 scenario. For the risk 
assessment calculation we are only concerned with aircraft containing composite 
material, estimated to be about 70 percent of the 1993 fleet, for a resulting 
national mean number of carbon-fiber aircraft accidents with fire of 2.6 per 
year. 
The calculation proceeds one aircraft size at a time. Accordingly, for 
airport A and aircraft of size S, we estimate the annual accident-with-fire 
rate by: 
NA,S x 2.6 (1) 
CCN 
AS A'S 
where N A s is the number of operations of aircraft of size S at airport A; thus 
the sum Represents all operations in the U.S. The model computes the expression 
(1) from appropriate input data, and then draws a random sample from a Poisson 
distribution with this mean value in each replication. 
In a related effort the principal aircraft manufacturers, NASA, and NASA's 
risk assessment contractors prepared estimates of the projected changes in the 
commercial aircraft fleet from now to 1993. These schedules included project- 
ed utilization of graphite fiber composite in each component. These data were 
combined with the accident analysis results to provide estimates of the amount 
of composite that would be involved in a fire following an accident to any of 
the projected new aircraft. In effect, for each projected aircraft type we 
computed the sum 
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C (fraction consumed)i 
i 
x (amount of composite)i 
for all accidents in the airframers' analysis, where the index i refers to an 
aircraft component. Thus, for one aircraft type, defined by a distribution of 
composite material, we have the total composite that would have been consumed 
in each of the historical accidents. These results were then used as the pro- 
bability distribution for the amount of composite involved in the fire. In 
each simulated accident the model determines the type of aircraft involved, 
based on the relative numbers of the different types in the fleet. For that 
type aircraft the model then draws the amount of composite involved from the 
distribution just described. It is then assumed that one percent of the carbon 
is released as 3-mm single fibers. In those accidents in which an explosion 
occurs, an additional two-and-a-half percent is assumed to be released due to 
the agitation of the composite material. These input assumptions are based on 
experimental evidence generated after completion of Phase I. The model also 
selects a random accident location based on analysis of the accident data. 
PLUME 
The graphite fiber release starts with an aircraft accident leading to a 
fire; the fire is fed by the aircraft fuel. As a result of the fire some 
fraction of the aircraft is consumed. The estimation of this fraction, and the 
ultimate amount of fiber released were discussed in the preceding section. As 
a consequence of the fire a hot buoyant plume is formed that rises to a 
"stabilization" height which is a function of the energy available, the wind 
speed, and the atmospheric stability. The graphite fibers enter the buoyant 
plume and are lifted to the stabilization height. 
Plume Height Calculation 
As in Phase I, calculation of the plume rise (or elevation), H, at stabi- 
lization from an open fire follows the work of Briggs (Ref. 1). The height of 
the plume, in meters, is given by: 
H= 2.9 (F/us) l/3 (2) 
for stable conditions, and 
H = 1 6F1'3u-1x2'3, when x <3 5x* . . 
H = l.6F1'3u-1(3.5x*)2'3, when x >3.5x* 
(3) 
(4) 
for neutral or unstable conditions, where u is the mean wind speed in meters 
per second and: 
x* = 14F518 , when F < 55 
x* = 34F215 , when F > 55 
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The buoyancy flux parameter, F, appearing in the above equations, is given by 
gQR F=- 
aCppT 
where: 
2 
8 = acceleration of gravity, 9.8 m/set 
QR = heat emission rate, kcal/sec 
C P = specific heat of air at constant pressure, 
.2391 kcal/kg'K 
P = atmospheric density, 1.239 kg/m3 
T = ambient temperature, OK. 
The atmospheric stability parameter, s, is defined by: 
where: 
a0 - = gradient of potential temperature, 0.35'/km aZ for stable conditions. 
Heat Emission Rate 
In order to use the Briggs formulas, we must specify Q,, the heat 
emission rate for a burning aircraft; this is, in turn, the product of the 
rate measured, gallons per unit time, and the fuel heat content per gallon. 
In Phase I a standard burn rate was used, based on experimental data. In Phase 
II we were able to turn to the detailed fire-accident analysis previously re- 
ferred to. In this case it was possible to estimate the fuel burn rate for 
accidents occuring during different operational phases, as well as accidents 
of different severity. The reported accidents involved small jet aircraft 
almost exclusively, so a scaling factor proportional to the relative volume of 
the aircraft fuel tanks, as reported in Janes (Ref. 2), was used to estimate 
the burn rates for other size aircraft. With these inputs we are able to 
determine the plume rise.for accidents involving different aircraft for any 
combination of wind speed and stability conditions. 
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DOWNWIND TRANSPORT AND DIFFUSION OF FIBERS 
Basic Concepts 
In Phase I the "standard" EPA transport and diffusion model was adapted 
to the needs of the risk assessment study. The model provides for downwind 
transport of material in the form of a plume that diffuses simultaneously in 
the crosswind and vertical directions. The initial source can be elevated at 
a specified height. The atmosphere is characterized as being in one of several 
stability classes. Dispersion parameters that govern the rate of crosswind and 
downwind diffusion are associated with each stability class (Ref. 3). The 
plume rise calculations, described above, give the source height, which is then 
used explicitly in the transport and diffusion model. 
In Phase II further extensions were made to the transport and diffusion 
model. These allow for multiple reflections of the diffusing particles and 
provide an improved mechanism for accounting for particle fallout at downwind 
distances that are so large that the cloud is uniformly dispersed in the verti- 
cal. 
The wind speed at plume height is taken as representative of the layer in 
which the carbon fibers are dispersing., The standard power law may be written: 
u = u. (H/7)' (5) 
The exponent p is assigned specific values for different stability classes. In 
most cases rather stringent physical conditions must be met for the plume to 
"punch through" an inversion. Observations indicate that this typically does 
not occur. It was therefore considered reasonable to assume that if the com- 
puted plume height is greater than the height of the inversion, it can be set 
equal to the inversion height. 
When the vertical range over which the plume is mixed becomes equal to the 
depth of the'mixed layer (below the inversion), we can assume a relatively uni- 
form distribution of particles in the vertical. The model therefore makes the 
distribution of graphite fibers uniform in the vertical, from the ground sur- 
face to the base of the inversion, when uz becomes larger than 1.6 H . m 
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OR1 Diffusion Equations 
With these assumptions, and the Phase II modifications to allow for multi- 
ple reflections, we obtain: 
D(x,y,O,H') = Q exp [ exp [ 
ITU (5 Y Z YZ 
l(H'+2H m> 
2 
5 
-H' + 2 H 2 
+ rexp [ - 2 1 + exp - 1 ( m> 1 
(5 u 
Z Z 
+ r2 2 -H'+4H 2 exp 1 - $ ( H'+4H ml 1 + rexp 1 - 3 ( m) 3 
u u 
Z Z 
+ r2 1 exp 1 - 7 (-H+6H 2 d 1 } 
u 
Z 
(6) 
where: 
D(x,y,O,H') = dosage at x,y,O (receptor location) in particle- 
sec/m3 for the particle size of interest 
x = downwind distance from source to receptor, 
y = crosswind distance from source to receptor, 
u = mean wind speed, m/set, 
Q = number of particles released 
u 
Y 
= standard deviation of the wind speed in the crosswind 
direction, as a function of x and the stability class 
u 
Z 
= standard deviation of the wind speed in the vertical, 
as a function of x and the stability class 
r = reflection coefficient, the fraction of particles that 
are reflected from the ground surface 
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In order to incorporate the effect of particle fallout into our calcu- 
lations we adopted the tilted-plume method presented by Van der Hoven (Ref. 4). 
Equation (6) makes use of the effective plume height, H', given by: 
H' =H-(vs/u)x (7) 
At distances far enough downwind (oZ B1.6 H ) that mixing results in an 
m 
essentially uniform distribution of the fibers in the vertical we use: 
D(x,Y,%H') = + exp 1 
vs x (l-r) 
exp [ - 2uH 1 (8) . 
ym Y m 
Inputs to Transport Calculation 
Mixing heights were developed, as in Phase I, from climatological mean 
values (Ref. 5) adjusted for different stability classes (Ref. 6). Sensitivity 
analyses are planned to test the impact of changes in mixing height values. 
In many diffusion problems it is customary to determine the location of 
an upwind virtual point source from which a diffusing plume would have grown 
to the size computed for plume stabilization. In view of the large uncertain- 
ties in other phases of the risk calculation, and our concern with effects 
some miles downwind from the accident site, we have set the virtual point 
source directly over the accident/fire site. 
The reflection coefficient has been set equal to 1 at the inversion and to 
0.7 at the ground. 
The diffusion calculation requires input values of the dispersion para- 
meters, (5 and r~ 
Y Z’ 
as functions of the downwind distance, x, and the prevailing 
stability conditions. The standard in this case is provided by the well-known 
Pasquill-Gifford curves. Several investigators have questioned their universal 
applicability; the reader is referred to Pasquill's recent work on this subject 
(Ref. 7). In view of the fact that no generally accepted modification of the 
Pasquill-Gifford curves exists, we adopted these curves for the Phase I calcu- 
lations and continued to employ them in Phase II. 
The basic weather inputs required - surface wind speed and direction, and 
stability class - are drawn from historical data. These data were obtained 
from the National Weather Records Center for the airports we studied; the data 
provide the frequency for each combination of the three weather parameters. 
The simulation model makes a random draw of one of these combinations weighted 
by the input frequency. 
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TRANSFER OF FIBERS INTO INTERIOR OF STRUCTURES 
Method 
When a building is impinged on by a plume of carbon fibers, some of the 
fibers may enter the building through air conditioning or other ventilation 
systems and by various leakage paths. Once inside the building or enclosure, 
fibers will be removed by fallout and through leakage paths back to the out- 
side. If inside air is recirculated and filtered, additional fibers will be 
removed. The concentration of fibers that produce failure stresses on equip- 
ments in a building or enclosure at any time may be determined from equations 
describing the net flow. These have been developed in a relatively simple 
form by Slade (Ref. 4). 
In Phase I, OR1 was able to show that the "transfer function" or ratio of 
interior to exterior exposure can be expressed as: 
E V. 1 -= 
EO 
vo+avs+v (9) r 
where: 
V. 1 = rate at which fiber-borne air enters the building, or enclosure 
through both the air conditioning system and through all sources of 
leakage 
V 
0 
= rate at which fiber-borne air leaves the building, including that 
removed by recirculation 
V = fall rate of carbon fibers 
S 
V r = rate at which fibers are removed by recirculation filtering 
a = area of space subject to fallout. 
Implementation 
Equation (9) formed the principal basis for the calculation of interior 
exposure values. It was assumed that all buildings can be adequately defined 
by one or more of the following categories: 
1. Small Equipment Building or Van 
2. Medium Equipment Building 
3. Large Equipment Building or Factory 
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4. Equipment Room inside a building 
5. Utility Room 
a> filtered 
b) unfiltered 
6. Residence 
a) air conditioned 
b. not air conditioned 
7. Retail/Wholesale Establishments 
Design factors were associated with each category of building defined above. 
These design factors are used to determine the air conditioning flow rates, 
filter efficiencies, and air leakage rates used in Equation (9). Ventilation 
rates were based on standards in References 8 and 9. 
Phase I values of filter effectiveness were revised to incorporate Phase 
II experimental results. The transfer functions shown in Table I were used 
in all Phase II calculations. Specific building types were associated with 
different categories of business and industry, as described below. 
EQUIPMENT FAILURES 
Failure Model 
The probability of failure of equipment which is exposed to carbon fibers 
is obtained from the exponential expression: 
PF = 1 - exp (-E/c) (10) 
where: 
PF = probability of equipment failure 
E = exposure level in the immediate vicinity of the vulnerable 
equipment, in fiber-seconds per cubic meter 
E = average exposure causing a failure. 
During Phase I, the U.S. Army Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL) at Aberdeen, 
Maryland determined that experimental failure data-fit an exponential failure 
law (Ref. 10). In Phase II it has been shown that, even for those equipments 
whose failures do not obey the exponential law, it is conservative to assume 
that the exponential law is obeyed. Typical values of the failure parameter 
for generic equipment types are shown in Table II. 
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The exposure used in Equation (10) is that directly impinging on the 
vulnerable equipment. When this equipment is inside a building, the interior 
exposure may be obtained from the exterior exposure by multiplying the exterior 
exposure by the appropriate transfgr function (TF). Since the transfer function 
and the mean exposure to failure, E, are constants for a particular piece of 
equipment in a particular building, we define a failure parameter: 
K ij = (TF)j/Zi (11) 
where: 
K ij = overall failure parameter for equipment of type i in a building of 
type cl 
(TF) j = penetration factor (transfer function) for a building of type j 
Ei = mean exposure to failure for equipment of type i. 
In subsequent applications, the parameter K.. 
1J 
is substituted into Equation (10) 
to give the probability of failure for equipment of type i in a building of type 
j for any exterior exposure: 
P F,ij = 1 - exp (-KijEo) (12) 
Equipment Configurations 
In treating typical equipment configurations it is convenient to develop 
expressions for the collective probability of failure of the complete configura- 
tion. In particular, if n identical equipments are in series so that a failure 
of one causes the entire "line" to fail, the probability that the line fails is: 
PF O.-m = l- (1-P F,ij) 
n 
e l- eBnKijEo (13) 
Similarly if n like equipments are in parallel, so that the operation fails 
only if all equipments fail, the aggregate probability of failure is: 
PF(Operation) = Pi ij , (14) 
The computer program that determines the impact of each simulated aircraft acci- 
dent and associated release of graphite fibers uses Equations (12), (13), (14) to 
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estimate the probability that each business or industry in the geographical 
area of interest is affected. 
One of the major efforts in Phase I was the characterization of each 
business-industry sector, defined by an SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) 
number, by a specific set of equipments installed in a specific building. This 
effort was extended and made more detailed in Phase II. A complete basic 
equipment configuration is shown in Figure 4; in any particular facility one or 
more portions of this configuration may not be present. In addition, the 
equipment "suit" is made specific to plant size (small, medium, or large). An 
example will illustrate the method. A large plant in Category 28A (comprising 
all 3-digit SIC code numbers under 28, basically chemical and allied products) 
has an internal power interface characterized by one set of input power service 
equipment, one distribution panel, and auxiliary power equipment. Its common 
module consists of two computers in parallel and two keyboard display units in 
parallel. The plant has 25 lines in its distributed module. Each line consists 
of: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 high-voltage power supply units 
5 interface units 
5 manual controllers 
5 minicomputers, used as controllers 
2 high-voltage motor controllers 
2 machine station servo-mechanisms 
1 heater control unit 
5 sensor units. 
Similar configurations were defined for all vulnerable categories of business 
and industry. The data was developed as a result of an extensive literature 
search, augmented by site visits during Phases I and II. The different build- 
ing types defined in Table I are related to the different modules of each type 
of vulnerable business and industry. For example, Table III associates the 
different building types with the major sections (modules) of plants of 
different size in Category 28A. 
Computer Implementation 
The mean exposure-to-failure values for several of the generic equipments 
defined above are summarized in Table II. In using these inputs the 
equipment-specific value of E was combined with the building-specific transfer 
function, in accordance with Equation (11). In order to estimate the impact 
on specific business and industrial complexes it was assumed that the plant is 
down if electric power is lost inside the plant, if the common module fails, or 
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if more than one half of the "lines" in the distributed module fail. Since 
Phase II results reported by other investigators indicated that the high- 
voltage power supply system is essentially invulnerable, it was assumed that an 
equivalent piece of equipment representing the output bushings and buss of a 
step-down transformer could be used to represent the possibility of an exterior 
power supply failure. 
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH EQUIPMENT FAILURES 
Scope of Calculation 
This section of the paper presents ORI's Phase II methodology for 
determining the costs associated with equipment failures. The most significant 
changes to the Phase I methodology were introduced in this part of the risk 
assessment calculation. Three categories of cost were defined for business and 
industry impacts: 
0 Repair of damaged electrical equipment 
0 Facility cleanup 
0 Business/industry disruption. - 
In the Phase I risk assessment, attention was focussed on the latter cost 
category using an expected value technique. In Phase II the model has been 
expanded to treat all the above categories explicitly, while disruption costs 
are now computed by a Monte Carlo process. Household equipment failures are 
treated as in Phase I. A completely new module has been introduced to compute 
the cost incurred due to repair of damaged avionics equipment. 
Repair Costs 
A repair cost was defined for each generic type of equipment shown in 
Table II. Categories of business and industry were defined by SIC code 
(primarily at the three-digit level) as well as by size. As described in 
the preceding section each facility has a specific number of each equip- 
ment type. The model computes the probability of failure for each type 
of equipment at a particular location; the number that fail is determined 
in a Monte Carlo random draw. Model inputs include the equipment repair 
costs. The product of the number that fail and the repair cost yields 
the repair costs associated with that kind of equipment at that location. 
Facility Clean-Up Costs 
Estimates of facility clean up costs were made for different businesses 
and industries on the basis of type of business and size of plant. Using 
information gained during the Phase II site visits it was estimated that the 
decision to institute a special plant-wide clean up would be made on the basis 
of evidence of major impact of the presence of carbon fibers. Accordingly, it 
is assumed that an intensive plant cleanup is implemented whenever the plant 
is shut down due to equipment failures, as described below. 
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Dislocation Cost 
It was assumed that a plant or place of business would be shut down if 
power is lost, the common module fails, or more than half of the production 
lines fail. This determination is made for each plant in one SIC-code group 
at the location. In contrast to Phase I, then, we determined plant closings 
on a plant-by-plant basis, rather than employing an expected-value algorithm. 
The fraction of.an industry or business shut down was estimated by comput- 
ing the employee-weighted fraction of production lost. The method may be ex- 
pressed as: 
c (No. of Empl.) SIC, Size x (No. of Plants Shut)SIC Size 
Size , 
FmCeSIC = .----. ---_--i.----.----~ 
c (No. of Empl) SIC, Size x (No. Of Plants)SIC Size Size , 
(15) 
The risk assessment model assumes that the impact of a carbon fiber incident 
on the economy can be measured by the fraction of the local GDP allocated to a 
particular industry over the period of time that the industry is "down." We 
assumed that the down time would be of the order of one day. The impact in 
dollars is then calculated by using this result in the following algorithm: 
c (Local Payroll)SIC 
cost = K SIC GDP 
(National Payroll)SIC 
SICFCSIC 
(16) 
National-level inputs from the Department of Commerce provide the national 
payroll broken out by SIC number and the Gross Domestic Product broken out 
by SIC number. Available data for counties surrounding the particular 
airport include payroll for each SIC-coded business and industry. The 
factor K adjusts the result for the fraction of a year the plant remains 
shut, since the other data is typically annual. 
Household Impact 
The method used in Phase II is essentially the same as that employed in 
Phase I. We define the fraction of households in an area that are air condi- 
tioned (FAC) and use the methods previously described to estimate the failure 
probability of vulnerable equipment in air conditioned and non-air conditioned 
households. The latter calculation includes both the failure and ventilation 
parameters. If the resulting failure probabilities are PF Ac in the air con- 
ditioned household and PF NAc in the non-air conditioned h:usehold, then the 
, 
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estimated cost to repair all damaged equipments of a particular class at all 
households is given by: 
Repair Cost x Number of Households x Number of Equipments per 
Household (PF ACFAC + PF NAc (1 - FAC)) 
, , 
The locations and numbers of residential units were obtained from the Bureau 
of Census publication, County and City Data Book. Based on the latest 
experimental evidence our attention was limited to household television and 
high fidelity equipment, while updated Phase II ventilation data were used. 
Geographical Area Specification 
As in Phase I, county-based economic data was adopted for computer input; in 
many cases counties were divided into smaller, homogeneous geographical units. 
In each case the center of the county or sub-county geographical unit was 
selected and a representative circle inscribed within the area. The input 
data set includes the coordinates of the center and the associated radius. 
The exposure and resulting impact calculations are made at the center and 
points a distance equal to two-thirds of the radius to the east, west, north, 
and south of the center. In each case the county-based business/industry 
sites are uniformly distributed over these five points. The concept is 
illustrated schematically in Figure 5, as applied to one county for the 
Washington National Airport risk calculations. In all cases this method was 
applied to the area around each airport to a distance of 80 km or more. 
Aircraft Vulnerability 
In Phase I, OR1 concluded that key airport operations were relatively 
invulnerable due to the many designed redundancies in the system. The analysis 
did not cover the risk to aircraft on the ground at the time of the accident. 
Because of safety-of-flight, as well as other factors, it was decided that an 
investigation should be made of the risk to aircraft on the ground, at 
passenger gates and maintenance locations. This was initiated in Phase II, and 
focussed on failures of avionics equipment. In a cooperative effort the air- 
craft manufacturers analyzed data to determine the number of aircraft expected 
to be at passenger boarding gates and at maintenance locations on the airport 
by day and night. This was done for the nine airports previously selected as 
representative (with a bias toward the busier airports). The 1978 data were 
extrapolated to the 1993 time frame, based on estimated fleet changes. For 
aircraft at each location a survey was made to provide estimates of the 
fraction of time each aircraft is in each of several defined ventilation modes. 
Transfer functions were estimated for each of these ventilation modes, for each 
of several locations on board small, medium, and large aircraft. The latter 
data, together with mean-exposure-to-failure values for typical avionics equip- 
ment enabled us to estimate the probability of failure of each of several 
generic classes of avionics equipment on board each aircraft. 
A summary of key avionics equipment input data is shown in Table IV. The 
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aircraft vulnerability module first randomly determines whether the accident 
occurred during day or night; it then selects the number of each size air- 
craft at representative gate and maintenance locations. The model aggregates 
each type of vulnerable equipment over all aircraft in one size range, and 
randomly determines, based on the input probabilities, the number of equip- 
ments in that category in each ventilation mode (transfer function value). 
The model computes failure probabilities and randomly determines the number of 
equipments that fail for the computed exterior exposure at each location. With 
the input repair costs we then determine the total cost. These steps are 
illustrated in the flow chart appearing as Figure 6. 
Costing Summary 
At one geographical location the model computes business-industry impact 
as the sum of costs of equipment repair, facility cleanup, and business dis- 
ruption. At those locations defined as residential centers the model computes 
the total cost due to household equipment failures. At the airport the model 
computes costs required to repair failed avionics equipment. Summary results 
for each simulated accident present the total of costs in each of these three 
major categories, obtained by adding the costs over all geographical locations 
that were affected by the accident. 
RESULTS OF AIRPORT SIMULATIONS 
Basic Results 
The simulation model was run for the nine airports previously studied in 
Phase I, and listed below: 
O'Hare/Chicago 
John F. Kennedy/New York City 
Washington National Airport/Washington, D.C. 
Lambert/St. Louis 
LaGuardia/New York City 
Logan/Boston 
Hartsfield/Atlanta 
Miami International/Miami 
Philadelphia International/Philadelphia. 
Figure 7 illustrates, schematically, the results provided by the simulation 
of randomly selected accidents. The data for one sample accident is shown 
in Figure 8. Randomly selected accident and weather parameters are indicated. 
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In this accident all impacts were limited to Queens County, represented by 
the circle, where the average exposure was 3.5 x 104 fiber-seconds per cubic 
meter. Damage to households there totalled $533; business impact was $37,177, 
of which $5,600 was equipment repair cost and $31,577 was due to business 
closings. 
For each airport the number of samples (replications) was selected so 
that at least 2500 accidents were simulated. In this section of the paper 
several examples of the results are presented. The accident results are 
summarized in Table V. The table shows that the airports near relatively 
small centers of population tend to have somewhat less costly accidents. The 
damage to avionics equipment appears to be small at all airports; the largest 
single impact on avionics in all simulated accidents was $3,910 at Kennedy 
Airport. 
Risk profiles were computed for all of the airports. Examples of several 
are shown in Figure 9. We first note that O'Hare/Chicago, the nation's 
busiest airport has a risk profile that shows that the probability of exceeding 
$10,000 in total CF-related impact is approximately .0004. For St. Louis, 
the corresponding probability is approximately .OOOl (one in 10,000). In 
comparing the risk profiles shown in Figure 9, it should be noted that O'Hare 
Airport is a high traffic airport serving a major urban area; Atlanta's air- 
port is also one of the busiest in the nation, while its population concen- 
tration is somewhat smaller. St. Louis is characterized as both a low-traffic 
airport and a relatively low population concentration. 
Accuracy/Sensitivity Test Results 
Several special analyses were conducted. We computed statistical 
confidence limits for the risk profiles. In Phase I it was shown that the 95% 
confidence limits could be expressed as: 
P+2 
J 
P(l-P) 
n 
where p is the computed exceedance probability after simulating n samples. 
Figure 10 shows the Washington National Airport risk profile with the 95% 
confidence limits. The confidence limits apply to the purely statistical 
nature of the simulation, and not to the impact of errors in input data. The 
results do show that conclusions based on the risk profiles need not be 
altered because of inherent statistical uncertainty. 
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An example of sensitivity testing that can be conducted with the OR1 risk 
assessment model is shown in Figure 11. In this figure, two O'Hare/Chicago 
risk profiles are compared: the best estimate in which the mean amount of 
composite per aircraft is 2803 kilograms, and a "worst case" in which all air- 
craft operating at O'Hare are assumed to be large jets with the maximum 
composite considered for any aircraft, 15,600 kilograms. The comparison shows 
the significant impact of the increased carbon fiber. Even in this case, 
however, the probability of exceeding $10,000 in annual damages in only about 
.005 (five in a thousand). 
To test the effect of increasing the sample size the O'Hare/Chicago 
simulations were run for 22,000 and 44,000 annual samples, resulting in 2537 
and 5038 accidents respectively. The outputs are compared in Table VI. The 
44,000-sample case indicates that a significantly larger extreme value 
occurred, The risk profile results are, however, quite similar. 
NATIONAL RISK 
Method 
In order to estimate the total national risk the set of airports for which 
the individual risk profiles were obtained was used to represent the entire 
United States. This set of airports accounts for approximately one-third of 
the nation's commercial traffic. Since they are predominately large, busy 
airports, this method overestimates the national risk. A random number of 
accidents is generated for a one-year replication at the national level. 
Individual accidents are allocated to airports on the basis of that airport's 
share of the total traffic. Instead of "replaying" the simulation for each 
airport we saved the individual accident results from the single airport 
simulations. For each airport that an accident is allocated to, the national 
model draws an accident at random from that airport's accidents that were 
simulated previously. Figure 12 is a flow chart for this calculation. 
Results 
The results of the calculation, using results from the individual air- 
ports, and the weighting factors described above, indicate a maximum annual 
impact for business and industry of $274,000, with a mean of $466. For 
avionics impact the results are $3,900 and $2, respectively. The national 
risk profile with the 95% statistical confidence limits is shown in Figure 13. 
In Figure 14 the Phase I and Phase II results are compared, showing that the 
new Phase II inputs result in a greatly reduced estimated risk. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
ORI, Inc. has developed a versatile generally applicable risk assessment 
simulation model. Using the best available data - we have assessed the risk 
associated with the use of carbon fiber composite material in commercial air- 
craft. Confidence in model-generated results is relatively high, based on 
examination of the statistical confidence limits, model stability, and 
sensitivity tests. As a result we conclude that the use of carbon fiber 
composite material in commercial aircraft structures constitutes a relatively 
low risk. 
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TABLE I. - VALUES OF TRANSFER FUNCTION FOR TYPICAL ENCLOSURES 
Enclosure 
Category 
1. Small Equipment Building or Van 
2. Medium Equipment Building 
3. Large Equipment Building or Factory 
Building (per floor) 
Transfer 
Function 
.012 
.OlO 
.004 
4. Equipment Room in Building (one exterior wall) .OlO 
-- 
Filtered .023 
5. Utility Room 
Non-Filtered .094 
Air Conditioned .058 
6. Residence 
Non-air Conditioned .a4 
7. Retail/Wholesale Establishment .004 
, 
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TABLE II. - MEAN EXPOSURE TO FAILURE (z) FOR TYPICAL GENERIC EQUIPMENTS 
(Fiber-Seconds per Cubic Meter) 
Equipment 
High-voltage Power Supply 
Interface Unit 
Manual Controller 
Computer ("Standard Size") 
Keyboard-Display Unit 
High-voltage Motor Controller 
Machine Station Servo-Controller 
Sensor 
Power Distribution Panel 
Switchgear 
Auxiliary Generator 
E 
lo8 
lo8 
lo8 
lo7 
lo8 
lo8 
lo8 
lo7 
108 
lo8 
106 
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TABLE III. - ASSOCIATION OF PARTICULAR BUILDING TYPES* 
WITH INDUSTRIAL FACILITY FOR SIC 28 - CHEMICAL 
ANTI ALLIED PRODUCTS 
Plant Size 
Large 
Medium 
Small 
* SEE TABLE I 
5b 3 5b 4 
5b 3 - 
5b 2 - 
DISTRIBUTED 
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TABLE IV. - AIRCRAFT AVIONICS EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATIONS WITH FAILURE AN-D COST 
INPUTS 
Aircraft 
Size 
Small 
Medium 
& 
Large 
Avionics 
Equipment 
ID No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Number on 
Aircraft 
38 
7 
6 
2 
1 
18 
26 
24 
153 
4 
22 
43 
3 
2 
4 
E Repair 
(Failure cost 
Parameter*) ($1 
108 100 
1.5 x lo7 100 
lo8 450 
1.5 x lo7 450 
lo8 300 
lo8 50 
1.5 x lo7 215 
lo8 220 
lo8 175 
lo8 250 
lo8 210 
lo8 385 
lo8 530 
lo8 1295 
lo8 1665 
*In fiber-seconds per cubic meter. 
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TABLE VI. - 1993 CHICAGO/O'HARE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT SETS OF SIMULATIONS 
22,000 
Samples 
44,000 
Samples 
No. of Accidents 2537 5038 
Mean Accident $147 $166 
Worst Accident $54,000 $110,299 
P > $1,000 .000955 .OOl 11 
P>$10,000 .000545 .000545 
175 
PHASE I 
___ ~-~~-~~ 
Analysis 
Experiments 
Model 
PHASE II 
Figure l.- Conceptual relationship of Phases I 
and II - OR1 carbon fiber risk assessment 
program. 
1st Accident 
Do 
stats 
Figure 2.- Flow chart for OR1 airport risk model. 
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Accident with Fire 
* 
Release of CF 
+ 
Plume 
4 
Transport & Diffusion 
4 
Transfer Inside 
4 
Equipment Failures 
4 
cost 
Figure 3.- Events in aircraft accident scenario 
replicated in each accident simulation. 
POWER MODULE 1 COMMON MODULE I DISTRIBUTED MODULE 
I I 
I 
I 
Drimsru - 
i + Computer + 
1 
Distribution ’ 
Panel + 
I 
I* 
Computer + 
/ 
I 
I +L.tLJlt+l-I 
I 
I 
Figure 4.- Schematic electric power flow in typical business/industry facility. 
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Commercial and ROIldenthl 
lNDUSTRlAL SUES 
Figure 5.- Definition of areas at risk for Washington National Airport. Howard 
County, Maryland, outlined in upper map, shown in detail in lower map. Cir- 
cles represent concentrations of business, industry, and residences. 
This Time. Location 
This Size AIC 
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Figure 6.- Flow chart for modeling avionics equipment failures. 
. . II , ,, I 
SAMPLE ACCIDENl \IRCRAFT 
:ATEGOR’r 
4CCIDENl 
TYPE WEATHER FAILURES CONSEQUENCES COSTS 
Figure 7.- Schematic illustration of detailed simulation results. 
Accident 
A/C Type 16 - 
Large Jet, 3000 Kg Composite 
Take-Off 
Release = 1.3 x 1010 Fibers 
Plume Height 100 m 
Figure 8.- Factors associated with one randomly generated accident 
at Kennedy Airport. Airplane indicates airport location; aster- 
isk indicates accident location. 
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Exceedance 
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100 
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1,000 10,000 100,000 
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Figure 9.- 1993 risk profiles for selected airports. 
ORD is O'Hare/Chicago; ATL is Hartsfield/Atlanta; 
STL is Lambert/St. Louis. 
Exceedance 
Probability 
Annual Cost ($) 
Figure lO.- 1993 risk profile for Washington National Airport 
with 95 percent statistical confidence limits. 
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.0001 - 
100 1,000 10,000 100,000 
Annual Cost ($) 
Figure ll.- 1993 risk profiles for O'Hare/Chicago. 
Comparison of best-estimate with "worst case" 
in which all aircraft are large jets with maxi- 
mum carbon fiber. 
Generate Random No. of 
Accidents in U.S. this Sample 
Accident to Airport 
I Draw Random Accident from File for the Selected Airport I 
Figure 12.- Flow chart for computing national risk. 
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Figure 13.- 1993 national risk profile with 95 percent 
statistical confidence limits. 
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Figure 14.- Comparison of Phase I and II national risk profiles. 
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